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1. Summary: Petrs seek reversal of the second 
circuit's judgment that their system for licensing musical 
2. 
compositions for performance entails price fixing, and therefore 
violates §1 of the Sherman Act. The second circuit also ruled 
that petrs, in fixing prices, had misused their copyrights. 
2. Facts and Previous Decisions: Petr BMI is a 
corporation that by contract has obtained the right to license 
the performance of thousands of musical works; BMI's stock is 
owned by 485 local broadcasters. ASCAP (petr in 77-1583) is an 
unincorporated association of music publishers and writers. One 
of ASCAP's principal functions is to arrange licensing for the 
musical compositions of its members. Ancillary to its role as 
licensor, ASCAP monitors radio and television broadcasts to 
detect any unlicensed uses of copyrighted material. The 
remaining petrs are members of ASCAP and clients of BMI. 
✓Virtually every domestic copyrighted musical composition is 
controlled either by BMI or by ASCAP. CBS is a national 
television network which for some time has purchased licenses 
from both BMI and ASCAP. __... 
For many years, BMI and ASCAP have gr an tea t _o licensees 
such as CBS "blanket licenses" for the performance of music under 
the licensor's control. For a stated term and fee (which is 
calculated as a percentage of the user's revenue), a blanket 
license allows the licensee to perform any copyrighted work of 






ASCAP keeps a record of which compositions are performed under 
the license, and pays a royalty only to those composers and 
publishers whose works are actually used. Under separately 
negotiated consent decrees, BMI and ASCAP must grant a blanket 
license to any user who requests it and must allow writers and 
publishers to issue performance licenses di ~ectly to users. See 
United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787 (S.D.N.Y.); 
United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, [1950-51] Trade Cases (CCH) ~62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
Moreover, under the 1950 consent decree, ASCAP must make 
I 
available to users a "per program" license, under which use rs pay 
a fee to ASCAP only for those programs on which one of ASCAP's 
· · f d 2 pieces 1s per orme . 
Several years ago CBS brought this action against BMI, 
ASCAP, and certain music composers and publishers represented by --
both. Of CBS' several antitrust charges in the district court, 
only three have survived appeal: (1) that the blanket license 
amounts to an illegal tying, (2) that the pooling of compositions 
and royalities leads inevitably to price fixing, and (3) that the 
foregoing antitrust violations constitute copyright abuse. The 
district court found that the blanket license was not an illegal 
tying, since, under the consent decrees against BMI and ASCAP, 
CBS could obtain "per use" licenses by dealing directly with the 
holders of the copyrights. Moreover, the district court rejected 
2/ The consent decree also provides that a licensee may ask the 
aistrict court to set a "reasonable fee" for any license over the 






CBS' claim that the realities of the market precluded directly 
dealing with copyright holders. As for price fixing, the 
district court ruled that CBS had not shown that "copyright 
proprietors would not compete with one another on a price basis 
if CBS sought direct licenses from them." Having found no 
indication that peLrs had used their collective leverage 
improperly, the district court dismissed the complaint. 
On appeal the second circuit upheld all of the district 
court's findings of fact. Accordingly, the appeals court 
affirmed the dismissal of resp's complaint, insofar as it alleged 
an illegal tying. The court rever5ed, however, on the price 
fixing charge, ruling that, because the licensing system required 
the copyright holders (the "sellers") to sell their products 
through a single agency at a single price, the system entailed 
price fixing and therefore was per se illegal under United St ates 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. , 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The court 
asserted in dictum, however, that such arrangements would not be 
illegal where the market could not exist without them; the court 
called this exception to the per se rule against price fixing the 
"market necessity" exception. In a cursory footnote, the court 
also found that petrs had misused their copyrights. 3 Rather 
than grant the injunction against blanket licensing which CBS 
requested, however, the court remanded to the district court for 
a determination whether some form of alternative "per use" 
licensing through petrs could be ordered that would avoid the 
Sherman Act difficulties. For criticism of the second circuit's 
3/ The petition states that since March 1978 CBS, invoking the 
court of appeals' finding of copyright misuse, has refused to pay 






decision, see Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies 
and the Per Se Rule, 87 Yale L.J. 783 (1978); Note, The Middleman 
as Price Fixer, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 488 (1977). 
Judge Moore wrote a separate one page concurrence, in 
which he agreed with the majority's decision to remand so that an 
order could be fashioned dealing with per use licensing. Judge 
Moore did not agree, however, that petrs' present licensing 
system entailed illegal price-fixing. 
3. Contentions: Petr vBMI puts forth ~ ree main reasons 
why the judgment of the second circuit should be reversed: (1) 
the court failed to appreciate the difference between a licensor 
(such as ASCAP) which acts as agent for its composers, and a 
licensor (such as BMI) which purchases rights in compositions and 
then sells those rights as an independent entrepreneur; (2) the 
blanket licensing system does not impose a "naked restraint" on 
trade, and therefore the rule of reason--rather than a per se 
rule--should have been applied; and (3) the court of appeals 
ignored the very different economic effects of copyrights and 
patents when it extended the doctrine of patent misuse to 
copyrights. 
Petr <scAP makes two arguments for reversal. First, 
ASCAP argues that errors committed by the court of appeals will 
wreak .havoc in future litigation involving antitrust laws or 
copyrights. Thus, the second circuit's opinion extends a per se 
ban on-all package licensing operations and casts a shadow on all 
common selling agencies. Moreover, the second circuit's "market 
necessity" exception to the per se rule rule against price fixing 







ASCAP's second complaint is that the appellate decision 
directly conflicts with two decisions of the ninth circuit: 
K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (1967), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); and Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish 
Co., 391 F.Supp. 962 (D.Ariz. 1975), aff'd on decision below, 541 
F.2d 226 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977). 
Beyond echoing the concerns of petrs, amicus composers 
Aaron Copland, et al., assert that the incidental restraint on 
trade of the blanket licensing scheme is no more pernicious than 
restraints posed by other, plainly legal, forms of business such 
as law firms and sports leagues. The composers also assert that, 
if blanket licensing involves price fixing, per use licensing 
will do the same. Finally, Mr. Copland and his colleagues urge 
the Court to consider the dire effects of the second circuit's 
decision, including: ruinous legal costs to ASCAP and the 
composers in defending the inevitable plethora of treble damage 
lawsuits that will arise; indefinite turmoil in the music 
industry resulting from the upsetting of a long-standing practice 
for licensing; and chaos in antitrust litigation, since "market 
necessity" will be a defense against all claims of what were 
previously per se violations. 
A second amicus brief has been submitted by the 
Performing Right Society Ltd and Societe des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique, respectively the British and 
French counterparts to ASCAP. PRS and SACEM argue that the 






licensing agreements--such as PRS and SACEM have with ASCAP and 
BMI--will be disastrous. Moreover, PRS and SACEM assert that, if 
their composers are forced to deal directly with users such as 
CBS, their clients will be at a competitive disadvantage. 
In response, CBS argues that the composers and 
publishers have dele~ated to a central committee the authority to 
set prices for their products, and that such conduct constitutes 
blatant price fixing which is per se unlawful under §1 of the 
Sherman Act. The fact that copyright owners also may sell the 
rights to their works directly to users is irrelevant; since 
price fixing agreements are unenforceable, individual price 
fixers always may sell outside of the cartel. The only exception 
to the rigid rule against price fixing is where it can be 
demonstrated that orderly operation of the market requires that 
minimal restraints be imposed. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade 
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 {1918). It is this exception that 
explains the apparent conflict with the ninth circuit's 
decisions. In the instant case, petrs themselves have proved 
that there is no market necessity for their licensing scheme by 
proving that direct dealing with composers is feasible. 
Insofar as the consent decrees outstanding against BMI 
and ASCAP require that they offer blanket licenses, those decrees 
are not binding on CBS, which was not a party to the prior 
proceedings. Any disruption the second circuit decision may 
cause in copyright dealings or in antitrust enforcement generally 
is the necessary result of the proper enforcement of the Sherman 







as a substitute for blanket or per-program licensing: Per-use 
licensing would allow a market to develop for direct licensing. 4 
4. Discussion: In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court ruled that "price fixing" 
(which includes any interference with the price a freely 
competitive market would give) is a per se violation of the 
antitrust laws. ~ mmon selling agents are given particularly 
close scrutiny as likely conduits for a price fixing cartel. 
See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 
(1933}. At the same time, however, the courts have been willing 
under som~ circumstances to allow incidental (as opposed to 
"naked") restraints on trade, where the purpose of the restraint 
is not to set prices and the restraint is necessary to some 
program that will yield important benefits, such as the proper 
functioning of the market. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
In the instant case, it is plain that the blanket 
licensing scheme interferes with what would otherwise be a 
competitively set price: Composers and publishers have little 
incentive to become involved in bidding wars among themselves 
when they may rely upon ASCAP or BMI to take care of all 
licensing. The restraint on trade that results from the common 
4/ CBS also requests that, if certiorari is granted, the Court 
review the second circuit's rulings against CBS on the latter's 








licensing arrangement, however, does not a_ppear to be a "naked 
---------'-------~' 
restraint." See L. Sullivan, Antitrust, 198-203 (1977). One of 
the major motivations behind the licensing scheme is the desire 
for an efficient, affordable means of monitoring copyright 
compliance. Thus, absent a central authority for monitoring, 
many performers could use the composers' wo1ks without being 
detected as copyright infringers. At the same time, the 
licen~ ing system is beneficial to users, who may contract with 
~ -
two organizations and thereby protect themselves against 
inadvertent copyright infringement. Whether the central 
licensing system is necessary to achieve these admirable results, 
is contested by the parties. 
The court of appeals failed to consider the purpose of 
the licensing system or its beneficial effects, focusing instead 
t 
on the necessary effect of the scheme on prices. In doing so, 
the court argued that the only exception to the per se rule of 
Socony-Vacuum is in cases where the market would fail to function 
entirely if the price restraint were forbidden. In positing this 
exception, the second circuit relied upon the reasoning of the SG 
presented in the govern~ent's amicu~ brief in K-91, Inc. v. 
Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert • 
. .,, ., 
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). In K-91, ASCAP's blan ', e_t licensing 
system was unsuccessfully challenged as a price fixing 
arrangement. In an amicus brief filed before this Court, the SG 
argued that a different case would have been presented, "[i]f the 
record ••• furnished any substantial basis for concluding that 







practical alternatives exist to bulk licensing of recorded 
music." In the instant case, the "market necessity" exception to 
the per se rule against price fixing is not available, since the 
district court found, and the circuit court agreed, that direct 
licensing was a viable alternative to blanket licensing. 
In sum, this case raises an ~ portant question: How 
incidental and otherwise beneficial a price restraint must be to --··- -·· 
avoid the per se proscription against price fixing. At least 
three approaches to this question are possible: (1) the Court 
could rule that whenever a business practice substantially 
affects competitive prices, it is illegal, (2) the Court could 
rule that price fixing is per se illegal unless the market would 
fail to function absent the price restraint, or (3) the Court 
could rule that restraints on prices are per se illegal only when 
the restraints are intended to affect prices--in all other cases, 
the extent of the effect on prices will be weighed against 
beneficial effects elsewhere. The Court's decision in this area 
would have special significance because of its recent decision in 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
Although in Sylvania the Court acknowledged that "[t]he per se 
illegality of price restrictions has bee+stablished firmly for 
many years," id. at 51, n. 18, it also stated that "[p]er se 
rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to 
conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." Id. at 49-50. 
The importance of the issue, the far-reaching effects of 






record suggest that certiorari should be granted. Since the SG 
has previously addressed this issue, however, I suggest that his 
views as amicus be solicited before the Court goes any further. 
8/13/78 
/ 
Westin Ops. of CA2 and DC in 
appendices to petns. 
There is a response from CBS; there are amicus briefs from Aaron 
Copland, et al. and from PBS and SACEM. 
- e · ' ( , · ' 
In the preliminary memorandum, I have attempted to portray 
the arguments pro and con fairly. My personal opinion is that 
the CA2 reached the right result for the wrong reason. Rather 
than applying a per se rule, I think the court should have found 
that the incidental nature of the restraint and its beneficial 
effects took it outside the scope of "price fixing." Applying 
✓ 
the rule of reason, however, I have severe doubts whether petrs 
have shown that the price restraint present here is necessary 
to achieve the desirable iffects of common licensing. Thus, 
if infringement monitoring is vital, it is plausible to suppose 
that composers would be willing to pay ASCAP (or a similar 
organization) to continue that part of its operations--without 
common licensing. 
Having said this, I still think that certiorari should 
be granted, as the errors of the CA2 are likely to cause 
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In the preliminary memorandum, I have attempted to portray 
the arguments pro and con fairly. My personal opinion is that 
'v\~ the CA2 reached the right result for the wrong reason. Rather 
Y ' than applying a per se rule, I think the court should have found 
that the incidental nature of the restraint and its beneficial 
effects took it outside the scope of "price fixing." Applying 
✓ 
the rule of reason, however, I have severe doubts whether petrs 
have shown that the price restraint present here is necessary 
to achieve the desirable effects of common licensing. Thus, 
if infringement monitoring is vital, it is plausible to suppose 
that composers would be willing to pay ASCAP (or a similar 
organization) to continue that part of its operations--without 
common licensing. 
• 
Having said this, I still think that certiorari should -
be granted, as the errors of the CA2 are likely to cause 
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EMORANDUM 
Further reflection has suggested one final thought you 
may want to consider regarding this case. Last term the Court, 
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 
U.S. , 46 U.S.L.W. 4356 {April 25, 1978}, ruled that a 
professional society cannot justify a price restraint by showing 
that the practice assures a high quality work product. In doing 
so, the Court apparently adopted Professor Turner's position 






that, in applying the rule of reason, only procompetitive effects 
~~~ ..... s•--------- ~.. 
can be counted as benefits. 
--"v 
Although the point is not argued in the petitions or 
responses, one could question whether the beneficial effect 
attributed to common copyright licensing--monitoring of copyright 
compliance--is procompetitive. r · believe, however, that this is 
too narrow a reading of N.S.P.E. v. U.S. As I understand it, 
only procompetitive effects are taken into account because the 
rule of reason is a device used by the courts to achieve 
Congress' purpose in passing the Sherman Act, and unquestionably 
the purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote competition. The 
2. 
Sherman Act, however, is meant to work in tandem with other 
antitrust laws, including the copyright and patent statutes. 
Thus, if ASCAP and BMI's functions are necessary to the very 
usefulness of the copyright system Congress has established 
y 
(which is what petrs claim), then their continued existence must 
be a factor to be considered in applying the rule of reason. 
Of course, the question of the factors properly 
considered under the rule of · reason only arises after one decides 
, 
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Justice Powell P--/~~. 
Re: BMI V. CBS, No. 7 7-1 5 7 8; and AS CAP V. CBS, y , ~~-f,4 4.~ 
No. 77-1583 ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ 
These cases present the question whether petrs' system ,? 
for licensing the right to perform various musical compositions ~ 
entails price-fixing and therefore is per se illegal under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. One of the primary purposes for 
this memorandum is to crystallize from the briefs of the 
parties and amici what seem to me the central issues for 
decision and summarize in simple fashion the primary arguments 
'f, ~ CJ'}- '2..- ~ 1.4 




for each side. In conclusion, I will suggest some of my own 
views on the role of a per se rule in situations such as this. 
As you can see from the briefing, there is a plethora of 
tan~ s, which I will do my best to avoid. 
I. Decisions Below 
ASCAP and BMI maintain similar systems for the 
\ icen~ ing of the performance rights of musical compositions: 
Representing their members or affiliates, they negotiate 
"blanket licenses" with users, under which the user obtains the - -right to perform any composition within petrs' repertory as 
many times as it wishes within the period of the license 
(either a year or a program). In late 1969, CBS instituted the 






licensing violated the antitrust laws. Specifically, ~ ~{LJ/t,.(u, 
- asserted tha~ etrs fixed the price charged for performance 
-
----- ----
licenses through their joint selling arrangements; that petrs 
ha~ ngaged in an illegal tying by requiring users to take a 
package of compositions; and tha~ etrs had monopolized the ..... ,,..,_ 
market of mus~· performing licenses. In addition, CBS charged 
-- 4 
that petrs ha misused their copyrights in order to commit 
....________ - -
these antitrust violations. 
After six years of litigation, the District Court f}-c.. 
(Lasker, J.) rejected all petrs' claims and dismissed its 
complaint. The court found there to have been no tying or 
price fixing because CBS was not forced to deal with petrs _______.....___ 
Co1;44i)--
at ~ 




of their works directly to users even though petrs have 
concurrent authority to do so. Moreover, the court ruled that 
petrs had not monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 
relevant market, which includes all potential sellers of 
performance licenses. As the court found there to have been no 
antitrust violations, it accordingly ruled that petrs had not 
abused their copyrights. 
3. 
The s,econd Circuit did not disagree with any of the CA 2-
District Court's findings o;-;:ct:- ~ or~ r, it concurr:a i~ 
- - ~ ' w- c::. ~ 
the lower court's analysis and conclusions regarding the ~~ 
alleged tying of compositions and the attempted and actual y~ 
monopolization of the industry. The Court of Appeals parted ~ +zt~ - ct.~ 
company with the District Court, however, on the question of ~J 
petrs' fixing of prices. Thus, the court stated that "even if 
the members of the combination are willing not only to join in 
~ 
~ 
the blanket license, but also to sell their individual ~~ 
performing rights separately, the combination is nevertheless a 
'combination which tampers with price structures [and 
therefore] engage[s] in an unlawful activity.' United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940)." 
Having concluded that petrs' blanket licensing schemes 
constituted price fixing, and therefore were illegal per se, 
the court went on to note that "in some circumstances market 
requirements would require the acceptance of some form of price-
fixing." The court therefore fashioned what it called the "Per CAZ 's -~ 





- - 4. 
that "price-fixing is per se illegal except where it is 
absolutely necessary for the market to function at all." The 
court rejected the market-functioning exception's application 





CBS' charge of tying: Direct licensing is a viable alternative ~ 
to blanket licensing. Accordingly, the court ruled that petrs ~ 
had fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act; in addition, 
the court in one cryptic sentence ruled that petrs had misused ~ 
~t<-,,,_J 
their copyrights by using the blanket licensing scheme. 
Resp 
II. Argument for Affirmance (C/35) 
CBS makes many arguments for affirmance, 
~~~ 
and 
provides the Court with many different alternative holdings. 
To my mind, however, resp has but two real arguments on its 
side. First, petrs' licensing systems fix prices and therefore 
are unlawful per se. Second, even if the rule of reason should 
be applied to petrs' behavior, the blanket licensing scheme 
violates the Sherman Act. 
A. Per Se Illegality 
According to this Court's decisions, the per se rule 
of illegality must be applied to conduct so plainly 
anticompetitive and devoid of counterbalancing virtue that 
there is no need to balance the competitive goods it produces 
against the competitive evils. See Continental T.V. v. GTE 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977); Northern Pac~~- v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "Price-fixing" is one of 
the activities identified by the courts as warranting per se 
- -
treatment because of its inherently anticompetitive nature. 




Petrs' licensing system has the necessary and direct 
effect of affecting the price charged users for performance 
licenses. To be sure, it is not certain that the purpose in 
forming petrs was to inflate the price charged for licenses. 
Even where a specific purpose to set prices is lacking, 
however, a combination may be per se unlawful if the 
combination's direct effect is upon prices and those 
participating in the combination have substantial market power. 
See L. Sullivan, Antitrust §70 (1977). The cases petitioners 
cite indicating that beneficial competitive effects may excuse 
what otherwise would be price-fixing are readily 
distinguishable. In each of these cases the effect of the 
challenged combination on prices was indirect at best. Thus, 
for example, in Chicago Bd~ Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
231 (1918), the combination merely restricted the times during 
which the market would be open. 
In the present case, on the other hand, petitioners 
expiicitly set the price charged for their affiliates and 
members' products. Indeed, petrs do not even set different 
prices for the various compositions under their control, but 
rather set the same price for all. Although petrs permit 
owners to deal directly with users, if they so wish, it is 






another over price when they know that, by sitting back, they 
will be assured of a steady income off of the prices set by 
petrs. Moreover, even if they are willing to go to the trouble 
of directly negotiat i ng, the price they can obtain under the 
blanket license arrangement largely will determine the range 
within which they are willing to bargain. 
The Court should not extend the exception of Chicago 
Bd. of Trade to cases such as the present one, for to do so 
would allow price-fixers to avoid antitrust liability by 
engaging in the most blatant sort of subterfuge. Thus, 
whenever there is a combination in restraint of trade some 
effect other than the fixing of prices may be asserted as its 
aim. To date, the Court has avoided this problem by 
considering beneficial impact only when the price fixing aspect 
of the combination is indirect--indeed, speculative. If, on 
the other hand, the Court were to eliminate application of the 
per se rule even in cases of direct price fixing, the per se 
rule would be all but eliminated, as in each case the courts 
would have to examine the subjective state of mind of those who 
formed the combination. 
The threat to competition posed by petrs' schemes is 
further underscored by petrs' remarkable market power: Between 
the two organizations, they control virtually all music 
commonly performed in the United States. This is in stark 
contrast to the system for stabilizing the coal market during 
time of crisis in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. Unite~ States, 288 
6. 
- -
U.S. 344 (1933), in which the Court explicitly noted that, 
- "[t]he evidence ••• makes it impossible to conclude that 
defendants through the operation of their plan will be able to 




Even if the Court were to consider the asserted 
benefits to be gained under petitioners' scheme, the per se 
rule should be applied here, as the benefits claimed do not 
bear any significant relation to the price-fixing aspect of 
petitioners' business. When examining price-fixing 
conspiracies, one cannot accept at face value the assertion of 
the alleged price-fixer that the conspiracies have some 
admirable purpose or effect. Rather, the court must look 
beyond the assertions of the defendants to determine whether 
there is any reasonable relationship between the restraint on 
competition and the alleged benefits; that is, would 
eliminating that portion of the scheme which fixes prices 
affect in any way the benefits the scheme produces? 
In the present case petrs have made no showing that 
the benefits attributed to their scheme would be eliminated 
under other schemes that would not lead to price fixing. Thus, 
it is possible that a market in copyrighted compositions could 
exist without any central broker, as the vast majority of 
compositions are handled by a handful of large music publishers-
-not by the individual composers. Even if some central broker 






which licenses are bought and remuneration is given composers 
and publishers. ASCAP could act much as a stock exchange does, 
matching buyers and sellers' bids in a truly competitive 
market. Similarly, ASCAP could provide its monitoring services 
to police compliance with the copyright laws without issuing 
blanket licenses. If this service truly is essential to the 
composers and publishers, then they would be willing to pay for 
it, and ASCAP could just sell its services. 
B. Rule of Reason 
Even if a rule of reason analysis is applied here, 
petrs' systems of marketing licenses must be ruled invalid. 
The negative effects on competition are manifest, as discussed 
above. Moreover, the claimed competitive benefits are not 
directly related to the device of the blanket license. 
Accordingly, the substantial restraint on competition posed by 
pet rs' arran_gements is unreasonable, and a violation of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act. 
III. Arguments for Reversal 
8. 
To my mind, petrs have one strong argument for 
C. 42-
reversal: The Court of Appeals seriously misunderstood the I . 
- ------------------------ /l+t..cA..-
scope of the per se doctrine under §1 of the Sherman Act. ~ 
Thus, the court looked only to determine whether petrs' &~ 
~
admitted combinations had some effect on the price charged for 
performance licenses. Concluding that they did, the court 
deemed petrs' activities "price fixing" and ruled them illegal 
per se under traditional price fixing doctrine. The court 
-
- -
failed, however, to note that most (if not every) combination 
has some effect on price. The courts, recognizing this fact, 
9. 
have developed the rule that only "naked" restraints o~ ade A-u.1.1 ,,<./--fl Al) 
~ will be subjected to the per se rule of illegality. Price ~
' -------- ----- - - -- ---
~ restraints are p ake d if_ J;]leir ultimate aim is to place 
? restrictions on the price charged for a product. Other 







judged by the rule of reason. 
Applying this analysis to the present case, it is 
apparent that the Second Circuit erred in applying a per se 
rule to the instant case. Although ASCAP and BMI through their 
licensing scheme necessarily affect the price charged for 
performance licenses, there is no indication that the primary 
purpose of these organizations is to fix or affect prices. 
Rather, it appears that petrs were created to fulfill the dual 
needs of composers and users: the creation of an orderly, 
easily run market for composers to sell their products, and 
provision of an easy mechanism for users to avoid copyright 
infringement. 
IV. Discussion 
Before dealing directly with the heart of this case--
application of a per se rule--you should consider two 
preliminary matters: (1) the importance of the allowance ------------- ....... 
petrs of direct licensing; and (2) the importance of the 
consent dec~ee. 
T LV-0 ., 
~
by ~ 





- - 1 0. 
licensing was a real alternative for CBS under petrs' systems 
of licensing as currently constructed. App. to Petn. at 111a-~ 
)L ~I /~ 
112a. Thus, the consent decrees under which petrs operate ~~. ~ - r.-. 
------- . r:r~ 
require that they allow their members and affiliates to license ~
,tt!C-
directly to users. Moreover, the District Court rejected CBS' ~ 
contention that t he possibility of direct licensing is a mere ~ 
chimera, as the alternative of blanket licensing removes all ~ 
incentives for composers and users to deal with each other ~ 
directly. 
finding. 
The Court of Appeals declined to overrule this /7// _ 
,.,. sr ·"1 
~.J.o 
The District Court mistakenly concluded, however, that ~ 
CBS could obtain licenses by bypassing petrs, petrs ~ 
were not fixing the price of performance licenses. As the Court ~ 
of Appeals correctly notes, price fixing has never been 
co2::s~d..e red ~~~d m~ y ~ ause a ~ yer can avoid the cartel. 
Indeed, in the classic price fixing case it is irrelevant 
whether the participants have any significant market power. 
See L. Sullivan, Antitrust §70 (1977). Thus, I would conclude 
that the possibility of direct licensing does not bear in any 
way on the question of the per se illegality of petrs' conduct. 
Petr BMI also suggests that it cannot have violated 
the antitrust law no matter how its conduct is described, as 
the consent decree under which it operates requires that it 
issue blanket licenses to those who request it. See BMI's 
brief at 18. If the consent decree required petr to blanket 
license, I would be troubled by a ruling that it had violated 
~. 
~ 
- - 1 1 • 
antitrust laws by doing so. Plainly it would be unfair if 
- businesses were found liable under the antitrust laws for doing 
what another court told them they had to do upon pain of 
contempt. I have read the BMI consent decree, however, and can 
find no such requirement. Accordingly, I do not believe that 




The principal qµ estj_on is whether a per se rule is fw-. tS.; 
applicable in circumstances such as these. This, in turn, 
depends upon whether conduct such as petrs' is so manifestly 
anticompetitive and devoid of redeeming competitive merit that 
there is no need to inquire into the actual effects of petrs' 
✓ 
licensing scheme. In GTE Sylvania the Court considered whether 
non-price vertical territorial restraints should be judged by 
the rule of reason or a per se rule. Noting the harshness of 
the per se approach, the Court ruled that such restraints no 
longer should be considered to be per se unlawful. ~ 
The situation is not entirely dissimilar with respect£.c.,/;-;:.-'A:1 
to combinations that have an effect on prices. Thus, in GT~ 
~ the economic and legal literature plainly established that 
vertical restraints both harmed and promoted competition: ~~ 
Although intrabrand competition is restrained by vertical 
territorial restraints, interbrand competition often may be 
promoted. Similarly, combinations that deter some price 
competition may nonetheless serve the interests of a 





trying to separate those combinations which may promote 
competition from those which plainly deter it only. 
1 2. 
CBS' claim that price fixing generally has been found 
to be per se unlawful is beyond challenge. The type of 




that which has as its primary purpose and effect the altering~ 
of prices--the so-called "naked" restraint. When part of the ~ ~ 
b h . d b ' . . h. h h - ~ purpose e 1n a com 1nat1on 1s somet 1ng ot er tan tampering ~ 
with prices, application of a per se rule is questionable. In ,.I.a Vo 
order to determine whether such a restraint is per se illegal,~gy-
~ the court must consider whether it contributes to the 
efficiency of the endeavor to which it is ancillary. Thus, for 
example, setting one price for the services of all attorneys 
within a law firm may be necessary to encourage the 
participation of all in the firm's affairs. Because the 
integration of a law firm may lead to economic efficiencies 
overall, we would judge the legality of this price setting by 
the rule of reason. 
I would conclude, therefore, that application in the 
present case of a per se rule was improper, as petrs' blanket 
licensing is part of an overall combination whose purpose in 
large part is to create and maintain a market in copyrig hts. 
~IA.~ 
___ ________....., ---- - ~ 
Thus, as petrs argue, the existence of some central authority~~ 
L4,., 
for the clearing of licenses appears to be essential to the ~ 
very existence of a market for copyrights. The alternative of 





would likely result in chaos, both because users would be 
tempted merely to violate the copyright, and because the 
transaction costs would be prohibitive. Congress, by creating 
1 3. 
copyrights and providing for their enforcement, has decreed ~~LJ:;:_ 
-  
that certain limited monopolies are in the best interests of ~le) 
the market. I would regard the furtherance of Congressional ~ 
policy in this respect, therefore, to constitute the sort of 
"pro-competitive" purpose or effect which extracts a 
combination from the realm of per se illegality. 
The q ~estion re~ ins, of course, whether petrs' system 
for licensing violates the rule of reason. This is far from an --------------.......... -
easy question, as I continue to have doubts whether blanket 
licenses are necessary to achieve the benefits petrs claim they 
produce. The question is made all the more difficult by the 
District Court's confused treatment of it. Although petr BMI 
claims that the court made an explicit finding that petrs' 
restraints were reasonable under the rule of reason, I cannot 
find any lucid discussion of the question in the opinion. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals plainly did not pass on the C fJ "'2. 
question of reasonableness. In light of this confusion, I ~~ 
think I agree with the Government's recommendation that the ....... _______________________________ _ 
A--, 







* d ~ ailed discussion of the rule of r ~ ason. 
------- ----
In conclusion, and acknowledging the superficial 
treatment given many issues in this memorandum, I recommend 
strongly the Government's brief here; to my mind it is better 
than anything the parties have produced. Moreover, I include 
an excerpt from R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978). This 
presents the law of horizontal price fixing as I learned it 
from Professor Kauper, and makes good sense to me. 
1/10/79 David 
1 4. 
*/ In its response to the petition for certiorari, CBS asked 
the Court to review also the lower courts' rejection of its 
tying claim. The District Court rejected this claim on the 
basis of its finding that CBS at all times had open to it the 
realistic alternative of purchasing licenses directly from the 
copyright holders. Thus, the court concluded that, if CBS could 
obtain the rights it wanted without buying rights it did not 
want, then there was no illegal tying. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed this ruling, as it concurred in the factual finding 
which underlay it. Although the problem of "music in the can" 
cannot be lightly dismissed, it seems to me that CBS really 
wants this Court to review the factual findings of two lower 
federal courts. Generally the Court declines such invitations, 
and I am not convinced that a detailed search through the 
volumes of testimony here would result in a conclusion 9 ~ different from that reached below. I therefore would be /  
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 77-1578 .AND 77- 1583 
Broadcast Music, Inc., et al. , 
Petitioners, 
77- 1578 v. 
Columbia Broadcasting SyStem, I On Writs . of Certiorari to 
Inc., et al. the United States Court 
American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers, et al., 
Petitioners, 
77- 1583 v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., et al. 
of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. J usTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves an action under the antitrust and copy-
right laws brought by respondent Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. (CBS), against petitioners, American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (BMI), and their members and affiliates.1 The 
basic question presented is whether the issuance by ASCAP f 
and BMI to CBS of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical 
compositiolls at fees negotiated by them is price fixing per se I 
unlawful under the antitrust laws. 
I 
CBS operates one of three national commercial television 
networks, supplying programs to approximately 200 affiliated 
1 The Distnct Court certified the case as a defendant class act.ion. 400· 
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stations and telecasfing approximately 7,500 network pro- I 
grams per year. Many. but not all. of these programs make 
use of copyrighted music recorded on the sound-track. CBS 
also owns television and radio stations in various cities. It is 
''the gia.nt of the world in the use of music rights." the "num-
ber one outlet in the history of entertainment." 2 
Since 1897.3 the copyright laws have vested in the owner 
of a copyrighted musical composition the exclusive right to 
perform the work publicly for profit, but the legal right is 
not self-enforcing. In 1914 Victor Herbert and a handful of 
other composers organized ASCAP because those who per-
formed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and 
widespread, and most performances so fleeting, that as a prac-
tical matter it was impossible for the many individual copy-
right owners to negotiate with and license the users and to 
detect unauthorized uses. "ASCAP was organized as a 
'clearing-house' for copyright owners and users to solve these 
problems" associated with the licensing of music. 400 F. 
Supp. 737, 741 (SDNY 1975). As ASCAP operates today, 
its 22,000 members grant it nonexclusive rights to license non-
dramatic performances of their works, and ASCAP issues 
licPnses and distributes royalties to copyright owners in ac-
ro,dance with a schedule reflecting the nature and amount of 
ti,.,e use of their music and other factors. 
BMI. a nonprofit corporation owned by members of the 
broadcasting industry,4 was organized in 1939, is affiliated with 
or represents some 10,000 publishing companies and 20,000 
authors and r.omposcrs, and operates in much the same manner 
as ASCAP. Almost every domestic copyrighted composition 
2 400 F. Pupp., at. 771, quc•ting a CBS witness. CBS IS also a leading 
mu:oi r. publbher, with publishing subsidiaries belorigirg to both ASCAP 
and BMI , and i:; the world 's largest marufacturer and seller of records 
and tapes. Ib id. 
3 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch . 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481. 
4 CBS was a leader of the broadcasters who formed BMI, but it disposed 
of all of its interest in the corporatio11 in l959. 400 F. Supp., at 742. 
- -
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is in the repertory either of ASCAP, with a total of three 
million compositions, or of BMI, with one million. 
Both organizations operate primarily through blanket li-
censes, which give the licensees the right to perform any and 
all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates 
as of ten as the licensees desire for a stated term. Fees for 
blanket licenses are ordinarily a percentage of total revenues 
or a flat dollar amount, and do not directly depend on the 
amount or type of music used. Radio and television broad-
casters are the largest users of music, and almost all of them 
hold blanket licenses from both ASCAP and BMI. Until this 
litigation , CBS held blanket licenses from both organizations 
for its television network on a continuous basis since the late 
1940's and had never attempted to secure any other form of 
license from either ASCAP 5 or any of its members. 400 F. 
Suoo., at 752-754. 
The complaint filed by CBS charged various violations of 
the Sherman Act 6 and the copyright laws.' CBS argued that 
ASCAP and BMI are unlawful monopolies and that the 
blanket license is ille~al price fixing, an unlawful tving arran~e-
ment, a concerted refusal to deal. and a misuse of copyrights~ 
The District Court. though denying summary judgment to 
certain defendants, ruled that the practice did not fall within 
tl-ie per se rule. 337 F. Supp., 394, 398 (SDNY 1972). 
After an eight-week trial, limited to the issue of liability, 
the rourt dismissed the complaint, rejecting again the claim 
that the blanket license was price fixing and a per se violation 
of ~ 1 of the Sherman Act, and holding that since direct nego-
tiation with individual copyright owners is available a.nd· 
feasible there is no undue restraint of trade, illegal tying, mis-
" Un.le;;, the context indicate;:; otherwise, references to ASCAP alone hr 
t.hi,; opinion usually apply to BMI a;; well. Seen. 21, infra. 
6 15 U.S. C. §§ 1 and 2. 
7 CBS ;:;eek,; injunctive r-elief for the antitru;:;t violations and a. rl.eclamJi-
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use of copyrights, or monopolization. 400 F. Supp., at 781-
783. 
Though agreeing with the District Court's factfinding and 
its legal conclusions on the other antitrust theories of liability, 
the Court of Appeals hel<l that the blanket license issued to 
television networks was a form of price fixing illegal per se 
under the Sherman Act. 562 F. 2d 130, 140 ( 1977). This 
conclusion, without more, settled the issue of liability under 
the Sherman Act, established copyright misuse ,9 and required 
reversal of the District Court's judgment, as well as a remand 
to consider the appropriate reme<ly.10 
ASCAP and BMI petitioned for certiorari, presenting the 
questions of the applicability of the per se rule a.nd of whether 
8 562 F. 2d 130. 132, 1:35, 1-!1 11 . 29 (CA2 1977) . 
9 At CBS's :sugge,-.tion, the Court of Appeals held tha.t the challenged 
conduct, con,-:tituted mi:;11,-.e of copy rights sole!~- on the basis of its finding 
of unlawful price fixing. 562 F. 2d, at Hl 11. 29. 
I 
10 The Court. of Appeals went on to :-:uggest some guideli11es as to 
remedy, indicating that de::;pite its conc]11:;ion on liabilit~- the bla nket license 
wa ~ not tot ally doomed. The Court or Appea ls said : f 
'·Normally, after a finding of price-fixing, tlw remed~- ic: an injunction 
against the price-fixing-in thi,-: ca;;e. the blank(,t license. We think, how.• 
ever, that if on rema,nd a remedy ca n be fashioned which will ensure that 
the blanket licen:-;e will not affect the price or negotiations for direct 
licenses, t.hf· blanket. licen:;e need not be prohibited in all circumstances. 
The blanket license i,-. not :;imp!~· a ' naked re:;tra int ' inelurtabl~- doomed 
to extinction . There 1~ not enough evidPnce in the pre:;cnt record to 
compel a. finding that the bla nket. licen:;e does not ~pn ·e a market need for 
those who wi:;h full protection agai n,;t infringPment ~uit"' or ,'"110, for some 
other bu,;ine:;:; JX>a:;on, dPern thP blanket li cense dP:sirabl P. The blanket 
licen::;e includes a practical covenant not to :-11c for infringement of any 
ASCAP copyright ,ts well a,-; an indPmnification agai nst suit:,: by others. 
' ·Our objpction to the blankPt Iicen,;p i,-. tlud it reduce:- price competition 
among the members and provide:- a. di:;in(' ]inatio11 to compete. We think 
that the::;e objPct1on:< ma .,· be rPmoved if ASCAP it.-:elf is rPquired to 
provide :;ornP form of per 11:'ie li cen,-ing which will en,-m e competition 
among the individual mPmber,; with rn,pect to those network:, which wish 
to n1gage in ppr u,;e hcm::;mg." ·562 F . 2d, at HO (footnotP::< omitted) . 
- -
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this constitutes misuse of copyrights. CBS did not cross-
petition to challenge the rejection of its other antitrust claims. 
We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues 
to the antitrust and copyright laws. - U. S. - ( 1978). 
Because we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusions 
with respect to the blanket lice11se. we reverse its judgment 
and remand the cause for further appropriate proceedings. 
II 
In construing and applying the Sherman Act's ban against 
contracts. conspiracies, and combinations in restraint of trade, 
the Court has held that certain agreements or practices are 
so "plainly anticompetitive." .Yational Society of Professional 
Engineers , ·. United States, 435 'C. S. 679. 692 (1978) ; Con-
tinental Tl', Inc. \'. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36. 50 
(1977) . and so often "lack . .. any redeeming virtue." North-
em Pac. R. Co. Y. Z.:nited States, 356 U. S. 1. 5 (1958). that 
they are conclusively presumed illegal without further exarni-
11ation under the rule of reason generally applied in Sherman 
Act cases. This per se rule is undoubtedly a valid and useful 
tool of antitrust policy and enforcernent.n And agreements 
among competitors to fix prices are among those concerted 
activities that the Court has held to be within the per se 
category.1 2 But easy labels do not always supply ready 
answers. 
11 "This principle of pet se 11nrea,-:onablene8>< not. only makes the type of 
refliraini.;; which nrr pro,;r1;bed h~· t he Shnman Art more crrta in to the 
benefit of evf'ryonr concerned, but, it also avoids the neres;:;1ty for an 
incrrdibly romplicatrd and prolonged economic inve~tigation into t he entire 
l1i:stor)· of the indust r.,· involvrd, as well a,; relatrd industrie:-<, in ;_1,11 effort 
to determine at largf' whetlwr n particular rnstraint has been umeasonable--
nn inquiry so oftc>n wholly fn11 tlf':-<,; whC'n under1akc>n." Northern Pac. R . 
Co. v. United States, :356 F S. 1, 5 (195f-). 
ee C'ontwental TT'. Inc . "· GTR Sylvania. lnc .. 433 U. S. 36, 50 n . 16 
(197i) ; United 8tates " . Topco Associates. l'llc .. 405 li. S. 596, 609 n. 10 
(1972). 
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A 
To the Court of Appeals and CBS, the blanket license in-
volves "price fixing" in the literal sense : the composers and 
publishing houses have joined together into an organization 
that sets its price for the blanket license it sells.13 But this 
is not a question simply of determining whether two or more 
potential competitors have literally "fixed" a "price;" As 
generally used in the antitrust field. "price fixing" is a short-
hand way of describing certain business behavior to which 
the per se rule has been held applicable. The Court of 
Appeals' literal approach does not indicate that this particular 
practice is one of those types or that it is "plainly anticompeti-
tive" and very likely without "redeeming virtue." -Literalness 
is overly simplistic and often overbroad. When two partners 
set the price of their goods or services they are literally "price 
fixing, " but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman 
Act. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 
271. 280 (CA6 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Thus, it is 
necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling 
within or without that category of behavior to which we 
apply the label "per se price fixing. '" · That will often, but 
not always, be a simple matter.1 
1 ~ CBS 11180 complams that it pays a flat fee regardle:;s of the amount of 
u;;e it make;; of ASCAl' compo,;itions and even though many of its pro-
gram~ contain little or no music. We are tmable to see how that alon1i 
could makr out an antitru~t violation or misu;;e of copyright~: I 
"Sound bu;;ine,;:; judgment could indicate that such payment represents the 
most convenient. method of fixing the busine;:;s value of the privileges 
granted by the licen:;mg agreement,. . . . Petitioner cannot complain 
because it must pay royalties whether it. use;:; Hazeltine patents or not. 
What it acquired by the agreement into which it entered wa,; the privilege 
to use any or all of the patent:; and development,; a;:; it desired to use 
them.'' Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950) . 
See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,Inc .. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
14 Cf., e. y ., United :States v. McKe1Sson & Robb·ins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305. 
- -
77-1578 & 77-1583-0PINION 
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. v. CBS 7 
Consequently, as we recognized in United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 607-'608 (1972), "it is only 
after considerable experience with certain business relation-
ships that courts classify them as per se violations .... " See 
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). 
We have never examined a practice like this one before; 
indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that "[i] n dealing 
with performing rights in the music industry we confront con-
ditions both in copyright law and in antitrust law which are 
sui generis." 562 F. 2d, at 132. And though there has been 
rather i11tensive antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and its blanket 
licenses, that experience hardly counsels that we should out-
law the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade. 
B 
This and other cases involving ASCAP and its licensing 
practices have arisen out of the efforts of the creators of copy- I 
righted musical compositions to collect for the public per-
formance of their works. as they are entitled to do under the 
Copyright Act. As already indicated, ASCAP and BMI 
originated to make possible and to facilitate dealings between 
copyright owners and those who desire to use their music. 
Both organizations plainly involve concerted action in a large 
and active line of commerce, and it is not surprising that, as 
the District Court found, "[n]either ASCAP nor BMI is a 
stranger to antitrust litigation." 400 F. Supp., at 743. 
The Department of Justice first investigated allegations of 
(1956) (manufacturer/whole,;aler agreed with indeprndent wholr;;alers on 
prices to be charged on product,; it manufactured) : United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co .. 310 U. S. 150 (1940) (firm,; controlling a ,;ubstan-
tial part of an mdus1ry agrred to purcha,;e ''surplu,;" ga,solinr with the 
intent, and necessary effect of increa,;ing the price) ; United States v. 
Trenton Potteries Co ., 278 U. S. 392 (1927) (manufactmers and distrib-
utor,; of 82% of certain vitreous pottery fixture~ agm~cl to ,;{'II at wufo1m 
vrices). 
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anticompetitive conduct by ASCAP over 50 years ago.1 " A 
criminal complaint was filed in 1934. but the Government was 
granted a midtrial continuance and never returned to the 
courtroom. In separate complaints in 1941, the United States 
charged that the blanket license, which was then the only 
license offered by ASCAP and BMI, was an illegal restraint 
of trade and that arbitrary prices were being charged as the 
result of an illegal copyright pool.rn The Government sought 
to enjoin ASCAP's exclusive licensing powers and to require 
a different form of licensing by that organization. The case 
was settled by a consent decree that imposed tight restrictions 
on ASCAP's operations.11 Following complaints relating to 
the television industry, successful private litigation against 
ASCAP by movie theaters, 18 and a Government challenge to 
ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign organizations, the 
1941 decree was reopened and extensively amended in 1950.rn 
Under the amended decree, which still substantially con-
trols the activities of ASCAP, members may grant ASCAP 
only the nonexclusive right to license their work for public 
performance. Members, therefore, retain the right individ-
ually to license public performances, along with the right to 
license the use of their compositions for other purposes. 
ASCAP itself is forbidden to grant any license to perform one 
or more specified compositions in the ASCAP repertory unless 
both the user a11d the owner have requested it in writing to 
do so. ASCAP is required to grant to any user making writ-
15 Cohn, :\iu:sic, Rad10 Broadca:;t.ers and the Sherman Act, 29 Geo. L. J . 
407, -!24 n. 91 (1941) . 
16 Complaint m United States v. ASCAP. ~o. 13-95, (SDNY 1941), at 4. 
17 United States v ASCAP, [1941-1943] CCH Trade Ca;;. i1 56,104 
(SDKY 1941) . 
18 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (SDNY 1948); 
M . Witmark & Sows v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (:Vlmn. 1948), app. 
dismis:;ed, 17i F. 2d 515 (CA8 1949) . 
19 United States v ASCAP. [1950-1951]. CCH Trade CM. 1 ~2,595 
(SD~Y 19:-iO) . 
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ten application a nonexclusive license to perform all ASCAP 
compositions, either for a period of time or on a per program 
basis. ASCAP may not insist on the blanket license, and the 
fee for the per program license, which is to be based on the 
revenues for the program on which ASCAP music is played, 
must offer the applicant a genuine economic choice between 
the per program license and the more common blanket license. 
If ASCAP and a putative licensee are unable to agree on a fee 
within 60 days, the applicant may apply to the District Court 
for a determination of a reasonable fee, with ASCAP having 
the burden of proving reasonableness.20 
The 1950 decree, as amended from time to time, continues 
in effect, and the blanket license continues to be the primary 
instrument through which ASCAP conducts its business under 
the decree. The courts have twice construed the decree not 
to require ASCAP to issue licenses for selected portions of its 
repertory. 21 It also remains true that the decree guarantees 
the legal availability of direct licensing of performance rights 
by ASCAP members; and the District Court found, and in 
this respect the Court of Appeals agreed, that there are no 
20 BMI i,:; in a similar situation . The original decree again,;t BMI is-
reported as C:nited States v. BM!, [1941-1943] CCH Trade Cas.,; 52,516 
(ED Wis. 1941) . An amended judgment was entered in 1966 following a 
monopolization complaint filed in 1964. United States v. B?vll, [1966] 
CCH Trade Cas. ,. 71 ,941 (SDNY 1966) . The ASCAP and BMI decrees 
do vary in some respect ,;. The BMI decree does not specify that B:\III 
may only obtain nonexclm;ive rights from its affiliates or that the District 
Court may set the fee if the parties are unable to agree. ~onethele:;s, the 
parties ;;tipubted, and the courts below accepted, "that CBS could secure 
direct licenses from BMI affiliate::; with the same ease or difficulty , as the 
case may be, a;; from ASCAP member,-. " 400 F . Supp., at 745. 
21 Uuited States v. ASCAP (Application of Shenandoah Valley Broad-
casting, Inc.), 208 F. Supp. 896 (SDNY 1962). aff'd, ;3;31 F. 2d 117 (CA2) : 
cert. denied , 377 l1. S. !:.197 (1964) ; United States v. ASCAP (Application 
of National Bruadcastwr1 Co.). [1971J CCH Trade Ca,-. i, 73,491 (SDNY 
1971). See al,;o l:11-ited 8tates Y . ASCAP (Jfotion of Metromedia. /uc.), 
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practical impediments preventing direct dealing by the tele-
vision networks if they so desire. Historically, they have not 
done so. Since 1946. CBS and other television networks have 
taken blanket licenses from ASCAP and BMI. It was not 
until this suit arose that the CBS network demanded any 
other kind of license?~ 
Of course. a consent judgment. even one entered at the 
behest of the Antitrust Division. does not immunize the de-
fendant from liability for actions. including those contem-
plated by the decree. that violate the rights of nonparties. 
See Sam Fo~r Publishing Co. \'. United States, 366 U. S. 683, 
690 (1961). which involved this same decree. But it cannot 
be ignored that the Federal Executive a.nd Judiciary have 
carefully scrutinized ASCAP and the challenged conduct. im-
posed restrictious on various of ASCAP's practices, and. by 
the terms of the decree. stand ready to provide further con-
sideration. supervision. and perhaps invalidation of asserted 
anticompetitive practices.23 In these circumstances, we have 
a un ique indicator that the challenged practice may have 
redeeming competitive virtues and that the search for those 
values is not almost sure to be in vain."H Thus, although 
CBS is not bound by the Antitrust Division 's actions, the 
decree is a fac t of economic and legal life in this industry, and 
the Court of Appeals should not have ignored it completely 
in analyzing the practice. See id., at 694-695. That fact 
alone might llOt remove a naked price-fixing scheme from the 
22 ~BC did in 19il reque;:t an annual blanket Jicrni'e fo r 2,217 specific 
ASCAP compo,-ition,; mo"t frequently u;:;ed on it., variety ~hows. It 
intended to acquire the remaining right,- to background and theme mu.sic 
through direct tran,-act10n,; b~· it and its program packagers. Ser United 
States v. AS('AP (Application of National Broadcasting Co.), s-upra, 11. 21. 
, a !1950-1951] CCH Trad(' Ca,-. ~i 62,595, at 63,756. 
2• Cf. Continental TV, Inc . v. GTE Sylvania. ht{· ., 433 U. S. 36, 50 11 . 16 
(1977) . :\foJ1eover, unthinkmg application of t he per se rule might up;;et 
the balancing of economic powrr aud of pro- and anticompetit ive effects 
pre;;umabl~· worked out m l he deeree. 
- -
77-1578 & 77-1583-0PINION 
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. v. CBS 11 
ambit of the per se rule. but, as discussed infra, Pa:rt III, here 
we are uncertain whether the practice on its face has the 
effect, or could have been spurred by the purpose. of restrain-
ing competition among the individual composers. 
After the consent decrees, the legality of the blanket license 
was challenged in suits brought by certain ASCAP members 
against individual radio stations for copyright infringement. 
The stations raised as a defense that the blanket license was a 
form of price fixing illegal under the Sherman Act. The par-
ties stipulated that it would be nearly impossible for each 
radio station to negotiate with each copyright holder separate 
licenses for the performance of his works on radio. Against 
this background, and relying heavily on the 1950 consent 
judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
claims that ASCAP was a combination in restraint of trade 
and that the blanket license constituted illegal price fixing. 
K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F . 2d 1 (CA9 
1967). cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1045 (1968). 
The Department of Justice, with the principal responsibility 
for enforcing the Sherman Act and administering the consent 
decrees relevant to this case, agreed with the result reached 
by the Ninth Circuit. In a submission amicus curiae oppos-
ing the station's petition for certiorari in this Court. the De-
partment stated that there must be "some kind of central 
licensing agency by which copyright holders may offer their 
works in a common pool to all who wish to use them.ir 
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae on 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin 
Publishing Co., 389 U. S. 1045 ( 1968). And the Department 
elaborated on what it thought that fact meant for the proper 
application of the antitrust laws in this area: 
"The Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly 
applied in light of economic realities. There are situa-
tions in which competitors have been permitted to form 
joint selling agencies or- other pooled activities. subject to: 
12 
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strict limitations under the antitrust laws to guarantee 
against abuse of the collective power thus created. Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1; United States v. 
St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383; Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344; Chicago Bd. of Trade 
v. United States, 246 U. S. 231. ' This case appears to us 
to involve such a situation. , The extraordinary numbers 
of users spread across the land, the ease with which a 
performance may be broadcast. the sheer volume of copy-
righted compositions. the enormous quantity of separate 
performances each year. the impracticability of negotiat-
ing individual licenses for each composition, and the 
ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to 
create unique market conditions for performance rights 
to recorded music." Id., at 10-11 (footnote omitted) . 
T he Department concluded that. in the circumstances of that 
case. the blanket licenses issued by ASCAP to individual radio 
stations were neither a per se violation of the Sherman Act 
nor an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
As evidenced by its am,icus brief in the present case, the 
Department remains of that view. Furthermore, the United 
Sta.tes disagrees with the Court of Appeals in this case and 
urges that the blanket licenses. which the consent decree au-
thorizes ASCAP to issue to television networks. are not per 
se violations of the Sherman Act. It takes no position, how-
ever, on whether the practice is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in the context of the network television industry. 
Finally. we note that Congress, in the new Copyright Act, 
has itself chosen to employ the blanket license and similar 
practices. Congress created a compulsory blanket license for 
secondary transmissions by cable television systems and pro-
vided that "[n]otwithstanding any provisions of the antitrust 
laws, . .. any claimants may agree among themselves as to 
the proportionate division of compulsory licensing fees among 
them, ma:y lump their claims together i;tnd file them jointly or· 
- -
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as a single claim, or may designate a common agent to receive 
payment on their behalf." 17 U.S. C. App.§ 111 (d)(5)(A). 
And the newly created compulsory license for the use of copy-
righted compositions in jukeboxes is also a blanket license, 
which is payable to the performing rights societies such as 
ASCAP unless an individual copyright holder can prove his 
entitlement to a share. Id., § 116 (c)(4). Moreover, in re-
quiring noncommercial broadcasters to pay for their use of 
copyrighted music, Congress again provided that " [ n] ot-
withstanding any provision of the antitrust laws" copy-
right owners "may designate cornmon agents to negotiate,• 
agree to. pay, or receive payments." Id., § 118 (b). Though 
these provisions are not directly controlling. they do reflect an 
opinion that the blanket license. and ASCAP, are economically 
beneficial in at least some circumstances. 
There have been District Court cases holding various 
ASCAP practices. including its licensing practices, to be vio-
lative of the Sherman Act,25 but even so, there is no nearly 
universal viev,: that either the blanket or the program licenses 
issued by ASCAP at prices negotiated by it are a form of 
price fixing subject to automatic condemnation under the 
Sherman Act. rather than to a careful assessment under the 
rule of reason . 
III 
Of course, we are no more bound than is CBS by the views 
of the Department of Justice . the results in the prior lower 
court cases. or the opinions of various experts about the merits 
of the blanket license. But while we must independently ex-
amine this practice. all those should cautio11 us against too 
easily fi11ding blanket licensing subject to per se invalidation. 
25 See ca.::;e,; cited n. 18, supra. Those casp,; involved licenses .;old to 
individual movie theater::; to "perform'' compo,;ition.; already on the motion 
pictures' ,;mmdtracks. ASCAP;s agreement with it,; member:; at that time-
prohibited them from engaging in direct transactions with ,;uch theaters. .. 
- -
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As a preliminary matter, ~ are mindful that the Court I 
of Appeals ' holding would appear to be quite difficult to con-
tain. If. as the court held. there is a per se antitrust violation 
whenever ASCAP issues a blanket license to a television net-
work for a single fee , why v,:ould it not also be automatically 
illegal for ASCAP to negotiate and issue blanket licenses to 
jndividual radio or television stations or to other users who 
perform copyrigh tee! music for profit? 2 '; Likewise. if the 
present network licenses issued through ASCAP on behalf of 
its memhers are per se violations. why would it not be equally 
illegal for the mernhers to authorize A.SCAP to issue licenses 
establishing various categories of uses that a network might 
have for copyrighted music and setting a standard fee for 
each described use"? 
Although the Court of Appeals apparently thought the 
blanket license could be saved 111 some or eveu many applica-
tions, it seems to us that the per se rule does not accommodate 
itself to such flexibility and that the observation of the Court 
of Appeals with respect to its remedy tend to impeach the 
per se basis for its holding as to liability.21 
~u Certain individual televi~ion and radio :;tation~, appeariug here as 
amici cunae. argur that the per se rule ,;hould extend to ASCAP'o: blanket 
licen,;e~ with thrm a,; well. The television ;:;tation:,, have filed a11 antitrust 
,;uii, to that effect. Buffalo Broadcasting Co . \", ASCAP, 78 Civ. 5670 
(SDNT filed Nov.27.1978) 
27 See n. 10, supra . The Court, of Appeals would apparently not outla.w 
the blankrt licen,;e acro,-s the board but would permit it in various 
circum,;t:rnces where it i:,; drrmed neres,:;ar~· or sufficiently de:Sirable. It 
did not even enjoin blanket licen,,ing with the television networks, the 
relirf it n·alized would normally follow a finding of JJl'r se illf'gality of the 
licen,;e in that context. In,;tead, as requested by CBS, 1t remanded to the 
D1"trict Court to reqmre ASCAP to offer in addition to blankrt. licensing 
some competitivf' form of per u;;e licensing. But per use li cl:'nsing by 
ASCAP, as recogmzed in t.he con:Sent decree:-:, might be even more su;:;cept,-
ible to the JJN se rule than blanket licen,-ing 
The rat-ionale for this unusual rrlief m a pei· se ca,se was that " [t]he• 
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CBS would prefer that ASCAP be authorized. indeed di-
rected, to make per use licenses available at standard rates 
within negotiated categories of use. 400 F. Supp., at 747 
n. 7.28 But if this in itself or iu conjunction with blanket 
licensing constitutes illegal price fixing by copyright owners, 
CBS urges that an injunction issue forbidding ASCAP to issue 
any blanket license or to negotiate any fee except on behalf 
of an individual member for the use of his own copyrighted 
work or works. Thus. we are called upon to determine that 
blanket licensing is unlawful across the board. We are quite 
surr. however. that the per se rule does not require any such 
holding. 
B 
In the first place. the line of commerce allegedly being re-
strained, the performing rights to copyrighted music. exists 
at all only because of the copyright laws. Those who would 
use copyrighted music in public performances must secure con-
sent from the copyright owner or be liable at least for the 
statutory damages for each rnfringement and, if the conduct 
is willful aud for the purpose of financial gain. to criminal 
penalties. 2i, Furthermore. nothing in the Copyright Act of 
1976 indicates in the slightest that Congress intended to 
weaken the rights of copyright owners to control the public 
blanket. license is not ~imp!)· a 'nah•d re~traint ' ineluctabl)· doomed for· 
extmction.'' 562 F . 2d, at l-10. To the ront.rar~·, the Court of Appeals 
found that the blanket license might well '·;:;erve a market need' ' for oomc. 
!bu!. Thu;, 1t, seem,; to u:;, i.:- not the per se approach, which doe" not 
yield so readily to circ1unstances, but in effect, is a rathrr bobta.ilecr 
application of thr rulJP of rea:;on, bobtailed in thr :sen::-r that it is unac-
companird by the 11rce:;,-;ar:v analy:sis drmon~trating 1Yh." the particular 
licensing system i~ an undue compet1tivr rr:;t,ramt. 
28 In its complaint, CBS alleged that 1t would br " wholl)· impracticable"· 
for ir to obtam mcliY1duaJ hcrnse:; cl ircctl)· from the compo,-rr,- and 
publishing housr:; , but it now ,-,ay,; that it, would br willing to do exactl.y 
that 1f ASCAP wa" rnJomed from grantmg blankrt hceJL~l-,; to CBS or its· 
comprtitors m thr rwtwork telcd,-1011 bu:;mr,;,-, 
2" 17 l.; S C App § ,50H, 
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performance of musical compositions. Quite the contrary -is 
true.30 Although the copyright la.w confers no rights on copy-
right owners to fix prices among themselves or otherwise to 
violate the antitrust laws, we would not expect that any mar-
ket arrangements reasonably necessary to effectuate these 
rights would be deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 
Otherwise, the commerce anticipated by the Copyright Act 
and protected against restraint by the Sherman Act would 
not exist at all or would exist only as a pale remillder of 
what Congress envisioned.31 
C 
More generally. in characteriziug this conduct under the 
per se rule," 2 our inquiry must focus ou whether the effect and, 
30 See Koenigsburg, The 1976 Copyright Act: Advances for the Creator, 
26 Cleve. St. L. Rev . 515,524,528 (1977) . 
3 1 Cf. Silver v. Neu· Yori: Stoel: E:rchange. 373 U.S. 341 (1963) . 
Because a mu:;irnl compositwn can be "conrnmed'' b~- many different 
people at the same time and without the creator':; knowledge, thf' "owner" 
has no real way to demand reimbursemf'nt for the use of his prope1i,y 
except through the cop_night laws and an effective way to enforce those 
legal rights. See Ttcentieth Century Music ('or]J. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 
162 (1975). It t.akes an organization of rat,hn large ,-ize to monitor most 
or all usf',; and to df'al with users on bf'half of the composf'rs. .vforf'over, 
it is inefficient to have too many such organization:; duplicating ea.ch 
other's monitoring of use. 
Surely, 1f ASCAP abandoned the issuancf' ot all license;; and ronfinf'd 
its activities to poliring the markf't and suing infringers, it could hardly 
be :,;aid that member copyright owner:; would be in violation of the antj-
trust lnw;; by not. having a. rommon agent is:<UP per u::;e licen~es. Under 
the copyright laws, those who publicly perform copyrighted music have 
the burden of obtaining prior corn,ent. Cf. Zenith Radio Cor]J. v. Hazel-
tinP Research, Inc ., 395 U.S. 100, 1:39-140 (1969) . 
•1~ The clo:,;e ;:;crutin~· orcai-'iorwlly required mm;t. not, merely sub:,;ume the 
burdem;ome a.naly:;i;:; required under the rulr of reason, s<"e National Society 
of Professwnal Engineers v . United ~tates . 4;35 [T_ S. 679, 690-692 (1978) , 
or else we should apply the rule of rrason from the ;-;tart. That is why 
the per se rule 1;:; not emplo~·ed nnt1l Hfter C'Oll:<idcrable experience with tJ1e, 
l.y_pe o{ challenged rr~tra111~. 
\ 
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here because it tends to show effect, see United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., - U. S. -, - n. 13 (1978), 
the purpose of the practice is to threaten the proper operation 
of our predominantly free market economy-that is, whether 
the practice facially appears to be one that would always or\ 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put, and in what portion of the market, or instead one de-
signed to provide increases in productive efficiency that may 
outweigh\ any ancillary injury. See id., at - n. 16; 1\ ·ational 
Society o} Professional Engineers v. United States, 433 U. S. 
36. 50 11. 16 ( 1977); ,\·orthern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 
356 U. S. 1, 4 ( 1958) . 
The blanket license, as we see it, is not a "naked restraint[] 
of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition," 
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), 
but rather accompanies the integration of sales, monitoring, 
and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use. See L. 
ullivan. Antitrust, § 59, at 154 (1977). As we have already 
indicated. ASCAP and the blanket license developed together 
out of the practical situation in the market place : thousands 
of users, thousands of copyright owners, and millions of com-
pos1t10ns. The users want unplanned and rapid access to any 
and all of the repertory of compositions. and the owners want 
a reliable method of collecting for the use of their copyrights. 
Individual sales transactions in this industry are quite expen-
sive, as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, 
especially iu light of the resources of single composers. I 
fo<leed. as both the Court of Appeals and CBS recognize, 
the costs are prohibitive for licenses with individual radio 
stations, night clubs, and restaurants. 562 F. 2d, at 136--137, n. 
26, and it was in that milieu that the blanket license arose. 
A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious neces-
sity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual im-
possibility. were to be avoided. Also, individual fees for the 
1t1se oJ inchviduaJ compositions would presuppose an intricate 
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schedule of fees and uses as well as a difficult and expensive 
reporting problem for the user and policing task for the copy-
right owner. Historically. the market for public performance 
rights organized itself largely around the single-fee blanket 
license, which gave unlimited access to the repertory and reli-
able protection against i11fringernent. When ASCAP's major 
and user-created competitor, BMI, came 011 the scene, it also ( 
turned to the blanket license. 
With the advent of radio and television networks, market 
conditions changed. all(J the 1Jecessity for and advantages of al 
blanket license for those users may be far less obvious thall is 
the case when the potential users are individual television or 
radio stations, or the thousands of other individuals and 
organizations performing copyrighted compositions in public.aa 
But even for television network licenses,. A8(' AP reduces costs I 
absolutely by creating a blanket license that is sold only a few,. 
· instead of thousands.3 1 of times. and that obviates the need for 
closely monitoring the networks to see that they are not l 
using more than they pay for. '"' ASCAP also provides the 
necessary resources for blanket sales and enforcement, re-
sources unavailable to the vast majority of composers and 
publishing houses. Moreover, a bulk license of some type is 
a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to 
achieve these efficiencies. and a necessary consequence of an 
aggregate license is that its price must be established. 
D 
This substantial lowering of costs, which is of course po- I 
tentially beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates 
aa And of rour,-e ehange,.: brought about by new technology or new 
marketing techniques might al,o undercut thr ju,;; tification for the practice. 
a-, The Di:,;trict Court fo11nd that CBS would requirr bf'tween -!,000 and 
8,000 individual license transactions prr ye[Lr. 400 F. Supp., at 762. 
ar, To operatr it, ,;yst cm for di:,; tributing the licrn~r revrnue,; to it, 
member,;, ASCAP relies pnmarily on t he network,; ' recor~ of which 
• compo:-itiom: a re usrd. 
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the blanket license from individual use licenses. The blanket 
license is composed of the individual compositions plus the 
aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater thau the 
sum of its parts; it is. to some extent. a different product. 
The blanket license has certain unique characteristics: lt 
allows the licensee immediate use of covered compositions, 
without the delay of prior individual negotiatious."" and great 
flexibility in the choice of musical material. Ma11y consumers 
clearly prefer the characteristics and cost advantages of this 
marketable package.'l7 and even small performing rights so-
cieties that have occasionally arisen to compete with ASCAP 
and BMI have offered blanket licenses."~ Thus. to the extent 
the blanket license is a different product. ASCAP is not really 
a joint sales agency offering the goods of many sellers. but is 
a separate seller offering its blanket license. of which the in-
dividual compositions are raw material."" ASCAP. in short, 
R,; See Tim brr:;, The Ant it ru:;t A~J>ects of ::\Ierchandi,.;ing Modern ::\Iusic: 
The ASCAJ-> Cou,.;ent ,Judgment of 1950, Hl Law & Contemp. Prob. 294, 
297 (Hl54) ('·The di"k-jockey':; itchy finger;: and the bandleader ':; restive 
baton, Jt is said, caunot wait, for contract:- to be drawn with ASCAP's 
individual publisher members, much le::-~ for formal acquiescence of a 
characteristicall~· mm vailahle compo:;er or author" ). Significantly, ASCAP 
deals only with nondramatic performance rights. l:lecau:;e of their nature, 
dramatic rights, ,.;uch a,; for mu:;icab, can be negotiated individually and 
well in advance of the time of performance. The :,;ame i;; true of various 
other rights, :-uch as ::-beet mu:;ic, recording; and synchronizatjon, which 
are licen:;ed on an ind1v1dual basis. 
37 Cf. C11ited State;;,·. Grinnell Cor11 .. '.{84 U.S. 56:3. 572-573 (1966); 
United States,·. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. :174 "C. S. 321, 356-357 (1963). 
3 ' Commenr, :\Iu:sic Cop~-right A:;,.;ol'iatiun~ and the .-\ntitrust Laws, :25 
lnd. L . . T. 168, 170 (1950). See also Garner, United States v. ASCAP, 23 
Bull . Copy. Soc. 119, 1-!9 (1975) ("'no performing rights are hcen~ed 0 11 
other than a blanket basi;; in any nation m the world" ). 
8 " :.VIoreover. because of the nature of the product-a composition can 
Le :;imulrnneausly "'consumed" by many u:ser;;-composers have numerous 
markets and numerom; incentives to produce, so ca.rtelization of the blanket 
licen:;e market i~ unlikely to cause decrea:;ed output, one of the normal 
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made a market i11 which individual composers are inherently 
unable to fully effectively compete:io 
E \ In sum. we have some doubt-enough to cou11se] against 
application of the per se rule-about the extent to which this 
practice threatens the "central nervous system of the econ-
omy." United States v. Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 226 n. 
59 (1940), that is, competitive pricing as the free market's 
means of allocating resources. Not all arrangements among 
actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price 
are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable 
restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competi-
tion, including price competition, and may seriously affect 
price levels; but they are not per se illegal and many of them 
withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard. 
Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also 
not usually unlawful. at least not as price-fixing schemes, 
where the agreement on price is necessary to market the 
product at all. 
Here, the blanket license fee is not set by competition 
among individual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the 
use of any of the compositions covered by the license. But 
the blanket license cannot be wholly equated with a simple 
horizontal arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does set 
the price for its blanket license, but that license is quite dif-
ferent from anything any individual owner could issue. The 
sha.re of ASCAP':,; revenue d1:;tributions, composers compete even within 
t.he blanket. license in terms of productivity 1111d consumer sati;;fact ion. 
'"Cf. United States "· .Sornny-Vacuum Oil Co .. ::no U.S. 150,217 (1940) 
(distinguishi11g Chicago Bel. of 'J'rade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 
(1918), on the ground that among the effects of the challenged rule there 
"was the creation of a public market"); United State.s v. 'l'renton Pot-
teries Co .. 273 F. S. :392, 401 (1927) (distinguishing Chicago Bd. of 'l'rade 
on the ground that it did not involve '·a prwe agreement among com-
petitors m an open market " ). 
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individual composers and authors have neither agreed not to 
sell individually in any other market nor use the blanket 
licenses to mask price fixing in such other markets.H More-
over, the substantial restraints placed on ASCAP and its 
members by the consent decree must not be ignored. The 
District Court found that there was no legal, practical, or 
conspiratorial impediment to CBS obtaining individua.l li-
censes; CBS, in short, had a real choice. 
With this background in mind , which plainly enough indi-
cates tha.t over the years. and in the face of available alterna-
tives. the blanket license has provided an acceptable mecha-
nism for at least a large part of the market for the performing 
rights to copyrighted musical compositions, we cannot agree 
that it should automatically be declared illegal in all of its 
many manifestations. Rather. when attacked, it should be u 
subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule 
1 
of reason . It may not ultimately survive that attack, but · 
that is not the issue before us today. 
IV 
As we have noted , the enigmatic remarks of the Court of 
Appeals with respect to remedy appear to have departed from 
the court's strict. per se approach and to have invited a more 
careful analysis. But this left the general import of its judg-
ment that the licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI under 
the consent decree are per se violations of the Sherman Act. 
vYe rev.erse that judgment. and the copyright misuse judgment I 
dependent upon it. see supra, n. 9. and remand for further 
proceedings to consider any unresolved issues that CBS may 
have properly brought to the Court of Appeals.' 2 Of course, 
"'' '·CBS does not claim that the individual member~ a11d affiliate8 
(' sellers') of ASCAP and BMI have agreed among themselves as to the 
prices to be cha rged for the particular ·products' (compo::;ition,;) offered 
by each of them." 400 F . Supp., at 748. 
iz CBS urge,; that if we disagree with the Court of Appeal,/ § I holding, 
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this wil l include an assessment under the rule of reason of the 
blanket license as employed in the television industry. if that 
issue was preserved by CBS in the Court of Appeals._," 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
case is remanded to that court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
and BMI have mcnopolized in violation of § 2, a claim that the Court of 
Appeals rej ected. But § 1 and § 2 judgments are not. fungible . Awarding 
CBS a § 2 judgment in place of what it won in the Court. of Appeals 
would am:mnt to cono:iderably different. relief. This, CBS is not entit.Led 
to without having filed its own petition for certiorari in this Court. 
"" Berausr of the United States ' interest in the enforcement of the 
consent decree, we assumr it will continue to play a role in thi::; lit.igaticm 
ou reniand. 
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Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., et al. j On Writs of C 
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Authors and Publishers, et al., 
Petitioners, 
o~ Appeals for the Second & A-~ 
Circuit. rv , 
77- 1583 v. 
Columbia, Broadcasti11g System, 
Inc,, et al. 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court holds that ASCAP's blanket license is not a 
species of price fixing categorically forbidden by the Sherman 
Act. I agree with that holding. The Court remands the case 
to the Court of Appeals, leaving open the question whether 
the blanket license as employed by ASCAP and BMI is unlaw-
ful under a rule of reason inquiry. l think that question is 
properly before us now and should be answered affirmatively. 
There is ample precedent for affirmance of the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals on a ground that differs from its ration-
ale, provided of course that we do not modify its judgment.1 
In this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was not 
1 See United States v. ;veic Y ork 'l'elephone. 434 U. S. 159. 166 n. 8 ; 
Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brink'rna11 , 433 U. S. 406, 419 ; Massachusetts 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. L'UClwig. 426 U.S. 479, 480-481 : United States 
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that blanket licenses may never be offered by ASCAP and 
BMI. Rather, its judgment directed the District Court to 
fashion relief requiring them to offer additional forms of 
license as well.2 Even though that judgment may not be 
consistent with its stated conclusion that the blanket license is 
"illegal per se" as a kind of price fixing, it is entirely consist-
ent with a conclusion that petitioners' exclusive all-or-nothing 
blanket license policy violates the rule of reason.3 
The Court of Appeals may well so decide on remand. In 
my judgment, however, a remand is not necessary:1 The 
record before this Court is a full one, reflecting extensive 
discovery and eight weeks of trial. The District Court's find-
ings of fact are thorough and well supported. They clearly 
reveal that the challenged policy does have a significant 
adverse impact on competition. I would therefore affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I 
Iii December 1969, the president of the CBS television 
network wrote to ASCAP and BMI requesting that each 
"promptly grant a new performance rights license which will 
t CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP. 562 F. 2d 130, 140-141 (CA2 1977) . 
a See majority op., at 14-15, n. 27 (describing relief ordered by Court 
of Appeal:,; as "unusual" for a per se case, and sugge,;ting that that court 's 
decision appea rs more con:;i:;tent with a rule of rea;;on approach). 
4 That the rule of rea:;on i,;sues have been raised and pre:;erved through-
out ;;eem,; to me clear. See CBS, Inc . v. ASCAP, supra, 562 F. 2d, at 134. 
("CBS contends that the blanket licensing method is not only an illegal 
1 ie-in or block booking which in practical terms is coercive in effect, but 
i:; abo an illegal price-fixing device, a per se violation .... " ) ; id., at 141 
11. 29. (''As noted, CBS also claims violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. 
We need not go into the legal arguments on this point becau::;e they are 
grounded on its factual claim that then' are ba rrier s to direct licensing 
and ·uypa;;s' of the ASCAP blanket Iicen;;e. The Dist rict Court , a;; noted, 
rejected this contention and its finding,; are not clearly erroneous. The § 2 
claim must therefore fail at t his time and on thl~ record!') ; Brief for 
Respon·dent1 at -JL 
- -
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provide, effective January 1, 1970, for payments measured by 
the actual use of your music." 5 ASCAP . and BMI each 
responded by stating that it considered CBS' request to be an 
applica,tion for a license in accordance with the provisions of 
its consent decree and would treat it as such,6 even though 
neither decree provides for licensing on a per-composition or 
per-use basis.7 Rather than pursuing further discussion, CBS 
instituted this suit. 
vVhether or not the CBS letter is considered a proper 
demand for per-use licensing is relevant, if at all, only on the 
question of relief. For the fact is, and it crurnot seriously be 
questioned, that ASCAP and BMI have steadfastly adhered 
to the policy of only offering overall blanket or per-program 
licenses,8 notwithstanding requests for more limited authoriza-
tions. Thus, ASCAP rejected a 1971 request by NBC for 
licenses for 2,217 specific compositions,» as well as an earlier 
request by a group of television stations for more limited 
authority tnan the blauket licenses which they were then 
5 CBS . Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp., 737, 753 (SDNY 1975) . 
6 ASCAP re::;ponded in a letter from its general counsel, stating that it 
would ronsider the reque:st at its next Board of Directors meeting, and that 
it regarded it as an application for a licen:se consi::;tent with the decree. 
"l'he letter from BMI',; president :stat{•d: "The B.\U Corporation Consent 
Decree provides for sPveral alternative licenses and we are ready to explore 
any of these with you." Id., at 753-754. 
7 See majority op., at 9, and n. 21. 
8 The 1941 Decree requires ASCAP to offer per-program licenses as an 
alternative to the blanket license. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 
Trade Case ir 56,104, at 404. Analytically, however, there is little dif-
ference between the two. A per-program license also cover,; the entire 
ASCAP repertoire; it is therefore simply a miniblanket license. As is 
t rue of a long term blanket license, the fees set are in no way dependent 
OJI the quantity or quality of the mu:sic used. See pp . -, - (Part III), 
infra . 
n See United States v. ASCAP (Application of National Broadcasting 
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purchasing.10 Neither ASCAP nor BMI has ever offered to 
license anything less than its entire portfolio, even on an 
experimental basis. Moreover, if the response to the CBS 
letter were not sufficient to characterize their cousisteut policy, 
the defense of this lawsuit surely is. It is the refusal to 
license anything less than the entirf' repertoire-rather than 
the decision to offer blanket licenses themselves-that raises 
the serious antitrust questions in this case. 
II 
Under our prior cases. there would be no question about the 
illegality of the blanket-only licensing policy if ASCAP and 
BMI were the exclusive sources of all licenses. A copyright, 
like a patent, is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges. 
The rules which prohibit a patentee from enlarging his statu-
tory monopoly by conditionillg a license on the purchase of 
unpatented goods.11 or by refusing to grallt a license under one 
patent unless the licensee also takes a license under another, 
are equally applicable to copyrights.12 
lt is clear. however, that the mere fact that the holder of 
several patents has granted a single package license covering 
them all does not establish any illegality. This point was 
settled by Autornat'ic Radio Ma.nufacturing Co . v. Hazeltine 
R esearch, Inc. , 339 U .. S. 827, 834 and reconfirmed in Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. , 395 U. S. 100, 137-
1 0 SrP C11ited States Y.''ASCA P {Application of Shenandoah Yallcy 
Broaclcwsting, Inc.) , 208 F. Supp. 896 (SDXY 1962), aff'd, 331 F . 2d 117 
(CA2 1964), cert. denied, :{77 l'. S. 997. 
11 Mercoid CorJ) . " · Mid-Co11t-ine11t lnvestm.ent Co .. 320 r. S. 661 ; 
.Ethyl Gasoli11e CorJJ . ,·. United Sta.le;,; , 309 U. S. 436; International Busi-
ne;,;s Machines CorJ). \'. r·nited States. 298 U. S. 131 ; United Shoe 
Machinery CorJJ. v. United 8t'ates. 258 U. S. 451. 
1 ' Indeed, the leading caSP:S condemning t he practice of "blockbooking" 
involved c_op,vrightcd motion pictures, rather than patent;; . See United 
States ,·. Para.mount Pict ures, 334 U. S. 131 ; United States \'. l.,oeu;'s Inc ., 
371 F . S. J8. 
- -
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138. The Court is therefore unquestionably correct in its 
conclusion that ASCAP's issuance of blanket licenses covering 
its entire inventory is not. standing alone. automatically un-
lawful. But both of those cases ide11tify an importa.nt 
limitation on this rule. In the former. the Court was careful 
to point out that the record did not present the question 
whether the package license would have been unlawful if 
Hazeltine had refused to license on any other basis. 339 U.S., 
at 831. And in the latter case, the Court held that the 
package license was illegal because of such a refusal. 395 
U.S., at 140-141. 
Since ASCAP offers only blanket licenses, its licensing 
practices fall on the illegal side of the line drawn by the two 
Hazeltine cases. But there is a significant distinction: unlike 
Hazeltine, ASCAP does not have exclusive control of the 
copyrights in its portfolio, and it is perfectly possible-at least 
as a legal matter-for a user of music to negotiate directly 
with composers and publishers for whatever rigl).ts he may 
desire. The availability of a practical alternative alters what 
would otherwise be the competitive effect of a blockbooking or 
blanket licensing policy. ASCAP is therefore quite correct in 
its insistence that its blanket license cannot be categorically 
condemned on the authority of the blockbooking and package 
licensing cases. While these cases are instructive, they do 
not directly answer the question whether the ASCAP practice 
is unlawful. 
The answer to that question depends on an evaluation of 
the effect of the practice on competition in the relevant mar-
ket. And, of course, it is well settled that a sales practice that 
is permissible for a small vendor, a,t least when no coercion is 
present, may be unreasonable when employed by a company 
that dominates the market. 13 We therefore must consider 
n See Tampa Electric Co. Y. Nashville Coal Co ., 365 U. S. 320, 334 
(upholding requirements contract on the ground that '·[tJhere is here 
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what the record tells us about the competitive character of 
this market. 
III 
The market for music at issue here is wholly do111inated by 
ASCAP-issued blauket licenses.11 Virtually every domestic 
copyrighted composition is in the repertoire of either ASCAP 
or BMI. And again. virtually without exception. the only 
means that has been used to secure authority to perform such 
compositions is the blanket license. 
The blanket all-or-nothing license is patently discrirnina-
tory.1 0 The user purchases full access to ASCAP's entire 
Pashiu11s [Co. " · Magrane-Housto11 Co .. 258 r. S. 3-161, nor myriad ont-
letB with ,;ub,;tantial sale:- Yolume, coupled with an indu,;trywide practice 
of rel~-ing upon exclu,;ive contrnct,:, a~ in Standard Oil fCo. Y. ·cnilecl 
States. :t17 ll. S. 293 I; nor a plainly re:-trictiw· tying arrangement a:-
in International Salt I_Co. Y. Cnited States. 332 r. S. 392l '') : 'Tim<"s-
Picayune Publi.shiug Co. Y. Cnited States. 345 (1. S. 59-1, 610--612 (up-
holding challenged adverti,;ing practice becau,;e, while the volumP of 
commf'l'Cf' affected wa:; not •' in:;ignificant or in:;ubstantial," :,;eIIPr was 
found not to occupy a "dominant po,<ition" in thP relevant market). 
While our cn;;e:; make clear that n violation of thr Slwrman Act requirn• 
both that the volume of commercf' nffected be ,;ub::<tantia l and that the 
;;eller enjo~· a dominant po:;ition, see id., at 608-609, proof of actual com-
pubion ha::< not been required, but cf. Roystei- D1·ive-l11 'l'healres, T11c. Y. 
American Bruadcasting-Paramount Theatres. Inc .. 268 F. 2d 2-16, 251 
(CA2 1959), cf•rt. denied, :361 U: S. 885; Yfilwaukee Tou•n Corp. ,·. T.,oe-1r's 
foe ., 190 F . 2d 561 (CA7 1951) , crrt. denied, 342 U. S. 909. The critica l 
que:;tion i~ onP of the likely practical effect of the arrangpment: whether 
the ';court beliPve::- it probable that performance of thr contract will forP-
tlo~P com1wtition in a sub~tantial ~hare of the line of commerce affpcted.". 
Tampa Electric Co. ,·. Nash ville Coal Co .. supra. 365 U. S., n1 327. 
1 ' A;:; in the majority opinion , m~· reft>rPnce::- to ASCAP generally encom-
pa~~ B~JI as well. 
1 " Srr Ci race, CBS v. ASC AP : An Economic Ana[y:;i,; of A Political 
Problem, 47 Ford . L. Rev. 277, 286 (1978) (''the all-or-nothing bargain 
allows thr monopolist to reap the benefib of pNfect price discrimination 
without confronting Hie problem,; po~ed by dPaling with different buyrr,; : 
QIJ diffnent term;:; .'')~ 
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repertoire, even though his needs could be satisfied by a far 
more limited selection. The price he pays for this access is 
unrelated either to the quantity or the quality of the music he 
actually uses. or. indeed to what he would probably use in a 
competitive system. Rather, in this unique all-or-nothing 
system, the price is based on a percentage of the user's adver-
tising revenues,10 a measure that reflects the customer's ability 
to pay i; but is totally unrelated to factors-such as the cost, 
quality, or quantity of the product--that normally affect price 
in a competitive market. The ASCAP system requires users 
to buy more music than they want at a price which, while not 
beyond their ability to pay and perhaps not even beyond wha.t 
is "reasonable'' for the access they are getting. 18 may well be 
far higher than what they would choose to spend for music in 
rn For many year:; prior to the commencement of this action, the B:l\tfI 
blanket li cern;e fee amounted to 1.09% of net receipt:; from spon:;or:; after 
certain ,;perified deduction:;. CBS. Inc. v. ASCAP, supra, 400 F. Supp., 
at 743. The fee for acces:; to ASCAP's larger repertory was set at 2.5% 
of net receipt:; ; in recent years, however, CBS ha:; paid a flat negotiated· 
fee, rather than a percentage to ASCAP. Record, vol. 23 , at £1051-1052', 
1135. 
i; See Ci race, supra, ;~88 ( 1978) : 
'·Thi:; hi:;tory indicate:; that, from it:; inception, ASCAP exhibited a ten-
dency to di:;criminate in price. A license fee based upon a percentage of 
gross revenue is discriminatory in that it grants the ::;ame number of rights 
to different licensees for different total dollar amounts, depending upon 
their ability to pay . The effectiveness of price discrimination is signifi-
cant!~• enhanced by the all-or-nothing blanket license." 
"Under the ASCAP Consent Decree, on receipt of an application, 
ASCAP i:; required to '·advise the applicant in writing of the fee which it 
d·eems reasonable for the license requested." If the parties are unable to 
Hgree on the fee within 60 day:; of the application, the applicant may apply 
tu the United State:; Distnct Court for the Southern Distrid of New 
York for the determination of a " reasonable fee. " United States v. 
AiSCAP. 1950-1951 Trade Case H2,595 (SDNY 1950). The RMI 
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a competitive system. It is a classic example of economic 
discrimination. 
The record plainly establishes that there is no ·price compe-
tition between separate musical compositions.19 Under a 
blanket license. it is no more expensive for a network to play 
the most popular current hit in prime time than it is to use an 
unknown composition as background music in a soap opera. 
Because the cost to the user is unaffected by the amount used 
on any program or on all programs, the user has no incentive 
to economize by, for example, substituting what would other-
wise be less expensive songs for established favorites or by 
reducing the quantity of music used on a program. - The 
blanket license thereby tends to encourage the use of more 
music. and also of a larger share of what is really more 
valuable music, than would be expected in a competitive 
system characterized by separate licenses. And since revenues 
are passed on to composers on a basis reflecting the character 
and frequency of the use of their music ,"0 the tendency is 
therefore to increase the rewards of the established composers 
at the expense of those less well known. Perhaps the prospect 
is in any event unlikely, but the blanket license does not 
present a new songwriter with any opportunity to try to· 
1" ASCAl"::; Economic E xpert , Robert Kathan, was unequivocal on this 
point : 
.;Q. L, there price competit ion under this system between separate musical 
compositions·? 
"A. No sir ." Tr. 3983. 
"" See CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP. supra, 562 F. 2d, at - n. 15. In determin-
ing royaltie;; ASCAP distinguishes between feature, theme and background 
u,;es of music. The 1950 amended decree requires ASCAP to distribute 
royalt ies on '·a ba;;is which giws primary consideration to the performance 
of the compositons." The 1960 Dec ree provided for the additional option 
of receiving royalt ies under a deferred plan which provide;; additional 
compensation based on length of membership and the recognized :status of 
t he individual 's work,; . See 1960 Trade Case ir 69,612, at 76, 469-470; 
(SD NY 1960) . 
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break into the market by offering his product for sale at an 
unusually low price. The absence of that opportunity, how-
ever unlikely it may be. is characteristic of a cartelized rather 
than a competitive market.21 
The current state of the market cannot be explained on the 
ground that it could not operate competitively, or that issu-
ance of more limited-and thus less restrictive-licenses by 
ASCAP is not feasible. The District Court's findings disclose 
no reason why music performing rights could not be nego-
tiated on a pAr-composition or per-use basis, either with the 
composer or publisher directly or with an agent such as 
ASCAP. In fact, ASCAP now compensates composers and 
publishers on precisely those bases!" If distributions of royal-
ties can be calculated on a per-use and per-composition basis .. 
it is difficult to see why royalties could not also be collected in 
the same way. Moreover, the record also shows that where 
ASCAP's blanket license scheme does not govern, competitive· 
markets do. A competitive market for "synch rights'' exists, 2:i 
and after the use of blanket licenses in the motion picture 
industry was discontinued/4 such a market promptly developed 
in that industry." 5 In sum. the record demonstrates that the 
market at issue here is one that could be highly competitive, 
but is not competitive at all . 
2 1 See generally 2 P. Areeda and D. Turner, Antitrust Law 280-281, 342-
345 ; Cirace, supra, at 28(-i-292. 
2 " See n. 20, supra. 
" 3 The "synch" right is the right to record a copyrighted song in 8>'n-
chronization with the film or videotape, and i;:; obtained ,;eparately from 
the right to perform the music. It is the latter which i,; controlled by 
ASCAP and BMI. See CBS. Inc . v. ASCAP. supra. 400 F. Supp., at 743. 
2 • See Alden-Rochelle. Inc. ,·. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (SDKY 1948) . 
25 See CBS, Inc . \'. ASCAP. supra . -!00 F. Supp., at 759-76;~; Tr. 77-774 
(te,;timon>· of Albert :Berman. Managing Director of the Harr>· Fox 
Agency, Inr .). Televi~ion ,;ynch right~ and movie pPrformance and s>·ncli 
rights are handled b>· the Fox Agency, which serve~ a,; the broker foJt 
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IV 
Since the record describes a market that could be cornpeti~ 
tive and is not, and since that market is dominated by two 
firms eHgaged in a single. blanket method of dealing. it surely 
seems logical to co11clude that trade has beell restrailled un-
reasonably. ASCAP argues, however. that at least as to CBS, 
there has been no restraint at all since the network is free to 
deal directly with copyright holders. 
The District Court found that CBS had failed to establish 
that it was compelled to take a blanket license from ASCAP. 
"\Yhile CBS i11troduced evidence suggesting that a significant 
number of composers and publishers, satisfied as they are with 
the ASCAP system. would be "disinclined" to deal directly 
with the network. the court found such evidence unpersuasive 
in light of CBS' substantial market power in the music i11dus-
try and the importance to copyright holders of network 
television exposure. 2r. Moreover, it is arguable that CBS could 
go further and. along with the other televisiou networks. use 
lts economic resources to exploit destructive competition 
among purveyors of music by driving the price of performance 
rights down to a far lower level. But none of this demon-
strates that ASCAP's practices are lawful. or that ASCAP 
cannot be held liable for injunctive relief at CBS's request. 
The fact that CB8 has substantial market power does not 
deprive it of the right to complai11 when trade is restrained. 
Large buyers, as well as small. are protected by the antitrust 
laws. Indeed. even if the victim of a conspiracy is himself a 
wrongdoer. he has not forfeited the protection of the la\.Y.27 
:Moreover. a conclusion that excessive competition would cause 
one side of the market more harm than good may justify a 
legislative exemption from the antitrust laws. but does not 
·w St>e CBS, Inc . v. ASCAP. sup,-a, 400 F . Supp., ar i67-771. 
27 Sre Penna Life Mufflers . Inc. v. International Parts Co1'p. , 392 U. S.. 
134, Ia8-140 ; Simpson v. Uniun Oil Co., 377 r. S. 1:3, 16-17 ; KiRfe1'-
•(e11 :ar/. Cu. v. Josi<ph E . Seaaram <t Sons, illc., 340 li S. Zll , 214. 
- -
1i-1578 & 77-1583-CONCUR & DISSENT 
BROADCAST MUSIC, IKC. v. CBS 11 
constitute a defense to a violation of the Shermau Act.28 
Even though characterizing CBS as an oligopolist may be 
relevant to the question of remedy, and even though free 
competition might adversely affect the income of a good many 
composers and publishers. these considerations do not affect 
the legality of ASCAP 's conduct. 
More basica.lly, ASCAP's underlying argument that CBS 
must be viewed as having acted with complete freedom in 
choosing the blauket license is not supported by the District 
Court's findings. The District Court did not find that CBS 
could cancel its blanket license "tomorrow" and continue to 
use music in its programming and compete with the other 
networks. Nor did the District Court find that such a course 
was without any risk or expense. Rather, the District Court's 
finding was that within a year. during which it would con-
tinue to pay some millions of dollars for its amrnal blanket 
license, CBS would be able to develop the needed machinery 
and enter into the necessary contra.cts. 29 In other words, 
although the barriers to direct dealing by CBS as a11 alterna-
tive to paying for a blanket license are real and significant, 
they are not insurmountable. 
Far from establishing ASCAP's immunity from liability, 
these District Court findings, in my judgment. confirm the 
illegality of its conduct. Neither CBS nor any other user 
has been willing to assume the costs and risks associated with 
an attempt to purchase music on a competitive basis. The 
fact that an attempt by CBS to break down the ASCAP 
monopoly might well succeed does not preclude the conclusion 
that smaller and less powerful buyers are totally foreclosed 
from a competitive market. 'w Desipte its size. CBS itself 
20 See National Society of Profe~sional Engineers v. r: ,dted States, 435 
U . S. (i79. 
21• See CBS. lnr·. " · ASCAP. 400 F. Supp., at 762-765. 
,in For an individual n~er, the transaction co:<t::- involved in direct dealing 
with individual rop~Tight holder:< may well be prohibitive]~· high. at lea8t 
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may not obtain music 011 a competitive basis without incur-
ring unprecedented costs and risks. The fear of unpredict-
able consequences, coupled with the certain and predictable 
costs and delays associated with a change in its method 
of purchasing music, unquestionably inhibits any CBS man-
agement decisiou to embark on a competitive crusade. Even 
if ASCAP offered CBS a special bargain to forestall any such 
crusade, that special arrangement would not cure the market-
wide restraint. 
Whatever management decision CBS should or might have 
made, it is perfectly clear that the question whether competi-
tion in the market has been unduly restrained is not one that 
any single company's management is authorized to answer. 
It is often the case that an arrangement among competitors 
will not serve to eliminate competition forever . but only to· 
cll.-.lay its appearance or to increase the costs of new entry. 
That may well be the state of this market. Even without 
judicial intervention, the ASCAP monopoly might eventually 
be broken by CBS, if the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
significant costs and risks involved in commencing direct deal-
ing."' But that hardly means that the blanket licensing 
Moreover, t he Di,;trict Comt found t hat writer~ and publi:sher:s support 
and prder the ASCAP ,;~·,;tC'lll to direct dealing. CB.S. Jue . Y. A.SCAP. 
~upra. -WO F. S11pp., at ifi, . While their apprPhen,.;ion at direct dealing 
with CBS could be ovrrcome. the Di:;t rict Courl found, b~· CBS' market 
power and the importance of telPvi:sion exposure, a ,;imilar conclu:sion i:s 
for le:ss likely wit h re"pect to othPr u,;ers. 
"' Tlw ri,;h involved in ,;11ch a venturP appPar to be sub:stantial. One 
:-;igrnficant ri:sk, which ma~· be traced directly to ASCAP and it:s members. 
relah:>~ to nrn,;ic ;,in the ca n"-m11:sic which ha,; been llf'rformed on ~hows 
and movie~ alread~· in t hr network's inventor~·. but for which tlw network 
mu,;t :still :;eeurP performing right:;. The network,; accumulate 8Ubstantial 
inn·ntorie.-; of .-; how~ "in the ca n." And, a" tlw Government ha~ pointed 
out a~ amic-us f ui·icil' : 
•lf the~· I the rwtworb and televi,;ion station/ I were to di.-;continue the 
b lankPt licrn,;e, thPY then would bP required to obtain performancP right.-; 
[or the~e already-1,"rod!lced ,;how:,;. Thi.-; attempt would C'reat; an oppu.r-
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policy at issue here is lawful. An arrangement that produces 
marketwide price d;scrimination and significant barriers to 
entry unreasonably restrains trade even if the discriminatiou 
and the barriers have only a limited life expectancy. History 
suggests, however, that these restraints have an enduring 
character. 
Antitrust policy requires that great aggregations of economic 
power be closely scrutinized. That duty is especially impor-
tant when the aggregation is composed of statutory monopoly 
privileges. Our cases have repeatedly stressed the need to 
limit the privileges conferred by pa.tent and copyright strictly 
to the scope of the statutory grant. The record in this case 
plainly discloses that the limits have been exceeded and that 
ASCAP and BMI exercise monopoly powers that far exceed 
the sum of the privileges of the individual copyright holders. 
Indeed, ASCAP itself argues that its blanket license consti-
tunity for the copyright owner:-, a:; a condition of granting performing 
rights, to at.tempt. to obtain the entire value of the show:; 'in the can.' 
1t would produce, in other word::;, a case of bilatnal monopoly . Becau::;e 
pricing i~ indeterminate iu a bilateral monopoly, television nPtworkti would 
not termmatP their blanket licen:;es until they had concluded au agree-
ment with Pvery owner of copyrighted mu:;ic 'in thP can ' to allow futme 
·performance fur an identified priee: the nPtwork:; then would dPtermine 
whPtlwr that price was sufficiently low that termination of the blanket 
licen,;p would be profitablP. But the prospect of ;iuch negotiat ion offer,-
the copyright:; owner::; an ability to mi::mse their right ::; in a way that 
f>n::mres thP continuation of blanket licen:::ing dP:spitP a changP in markPt 
condition::; t hat may make other form;, of Iicen:;ing preferable." Brief for 
the Unitl'd State:; a::; Amicu~ Curiae. at 24-25. 
Tim analy::;i::; i::; in no seJ1::;p incon::;i:;tent with thP finding::; of the Di::;trict 
Court. The Di,;trict Court did reject. CBS' coercion argumPnt as to 
mu:;ic ·' in the can." But a::; tht0 Government again point::; out, the Di::;-
trict Court 's finding::; wPrP ;1ddre~::;ed essentiall~· to a tie-in claim; " the 
court did uot con:;idPr the pos:sibility that thP eop~-right owner~• :self-
1ntere~ted, non-coercivP demand~ for compensation might neverthele:;,; 
make the co:st of CBS ' dropping the blanket licPll81' ::;ufticiPntly high that 
ASCAP and RMI could takf' thi,; ·termination penalty ' into account in 
::;etting fPe::; for the blanket ]icen,;e," Id ., at 25 n . 2;1 
- -
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tutes a product that is significantly different from the sum of 
its component parts. I agree with that premise. but I con~ 
elude that the aggTegate is a monopolistic restraint of trad,e 
proscribed by the Sherman Act: 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . .J . B RENNAN, JR. 
- -
~u:prmt.t <!Jcnrl cf flyt ~it.eh ;§;fa.ttg 
1frudpngtc-n.1I}. QJ. 20ffe~~ 
April 10, 1979 
RE: Nos. 77-1578 and 77-1583 Broadcast Music & ASCAP 
v. CBS, Inc. 
Dear Byron: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice White 
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